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Bernanke (2005) hypothesized that a “global savings glut” was causing large trade imbalances.  However,
we show that the global savings rates did not show a robust upward trend during the relevant period.
Moreover, if there had been a global savings glut there should have been a large investment boom
in the countries that imported capital.  Instead, those countries experienced consumption booms.  National
asset bubbles explain the international imbalances.  The bubbles raised consumption, resulting in large
trade deficits.  In a sample of 18 OECD countries plus China, movements in home prices alone explain













jmollers@fas.harvard.edu1 Facts and Figures
Over the last decade, extreme asset price increases have coincided with un-
precedented imbalances in international ￿nancial ￿ ows. Many developed
countries have run enormous trade de￿cits, while many developing coun-
tries have run large surpluses. In 1996, the US trade de￿cit was 1.5% of
GDP, but by 2006 the trade de￿cit had ballooned to 6.0%. Conversely, over
this period, the Chinese trade surplus rose signi￿cantly. Figure 1 plots the
current account surplus in the United States, China, OECD and the BRIC
countries.1
Figure 1 about here.
Economists have tried to identify the mechanisms that are causing these
international imbalances and the coincident asset price movements (e.g.,
Ventura 2001; Kraay and Ventura 2007; Caballero, Farhi, and Gourinchas
2008a,b; Basco 2009). One leading explanation has been the existence of
a ￿global savings glut￿ , which Ben Bernanke identi￿ed in two in￿ uential
speeches in 2005 (Bernanke, 2005). According to this account, in the af-
termath of the Asian ￿nancial crisis of 1997-1998, developing countries in-
creased their supply of savings.2 This shift is thought to have caused de-
veloping countries to run large current account surpluses and developed
countries to run o⁄setting current account de￿cits.
In the current paper, we argue that the theory of a global savings glut
does not explain the observed data. To make this point, we provide several
arguments. First, we show that the global savings and investment rates did
not show a robust upward trend during the period that Bernanke associated
with the global savings glut, 1996-2006.3 Had a global savings glut existed
(an outward shift in the world supply of savings) it should have caused a
boom in global observed savings and investment.
Second, we calibrate a model for the economies that received capital
in￿ ows. The calibrated model predicts that if there had been a savings
1The BRIC countries are Brazil, Russia, India, and China.
2The Asian ￿nancial crisis was a series of crises starting in July 1997. The crisis started
in Thailand with the collapse of the Thai baht. The crisis then spread from Thailand to
most of Southeast Asia, particularly Indonesia and South Korea. In some Asian countries
the excess savings (i.e. savings in excess of investment) arose because of a decrease in
investment rather than a rise in savings.
3We start with 1996, since this just predates the Asian ￿nancial crises. We end with
2006, since this is the year that the U.S. current account de￿cit peaked.
1glut there should have been a large investment boom in the countries that
imported capital. For our benchmark calibration, we ￿nd that the invest-
ment rate should have risen by at least 4% of GDP. Intuitively, if the Chinese
government exogenously loaned U.S. households a trillion dollars, those U.S.
households should have chosen to invest a substantial share of those funds
to help make the interest payments. However, such an investment boom did
not occur. Instead the US absorbed most of the imported capital through a
consumption boom.
This calibration also casts a critical light on the arguments of Caballero,
Farhi, and Gourinchas (2008a, b), hereafter CFG. Like Bernanke, CFG also
hypothesise that an external shock led the U.S. to run international imbal-
ances. Unlike Bernanke, they argue that this ￿ ow derived from an asset-
shortage in Asia. In their account, Asian savers sought new markets in which
to invest their wealth. However, the exogenous capital ￿ ow hypothesised by
CFG should have led to a counter-factual investment boom in the economies
that absorbed those ￿ ows.
We suggest an alternative explanation for the unbalanced ￿nancial ￿ ows
of the past decade. We argue that asset price movements, including the
bubbles in equity markets and residential real estate markets, do a better
job of explaining the international ￿nancial ￿ ows.4 During the period of in-
￿ ated asset values, U.S. consumers spent their new wealth, with a marginal
propensity to consume of about 4%. Our calibrated model predicts the con-
sumption patterns that occurred in the developed economies, speci￿cally the
selective consumption booms that arose in the countries that experienced
asset bubbles. Our calibrated model also explains why the capital imports
were consumed and not invested. Our approach provides a simple and par-
simonious explanation to the puzzle of large international imbalances. The
asset bubble framework quantitatively explains the large current account
de￿cit of the US (peaking at 6%) and the modest increase in investment
during the same period (less than 2% of GDP).5
Finally, we show empirically that asset price movements explain a sub-
stantial share of the cross-sectional variation in international ￿nancial ￿ ows.
In a sample of 18 OECD countries plus China, we ￿nd that movements in
residential home prices alone explain around 50% of the variation in accumu-
lated current account de￿cits. Figure 2 plots the percentage increase in the
price of residential real estate on the horizontal axis and the accumulated
4In our model we assume the existence of a bubble, both in housing and equity, which
is not uncontroversial. In doing so, we are building on the growing literature that claims
that such bubbles do exist. See e.g. Schiller (2005) and Glaeser et al. (2008).
5Investment is compared to the average level from 1929-2008.
2current account balance on the vertical axis.6
Figure 2 about here
In the last section of the paper, we emphasise two open questions. First,
our model does not explain why the asset price bubbles occurred in the ￿rst
place. Second, our model does not explain why interest rates fell between
2000 and 2003. We argue that the fall in real interest rates can probably be
traced to ￿ve factors: (1) a shift from equities to ￿xed income instruments
during and after the bursting of the tech bubble, also accompanied by an
enormous increase in ￿xed-income foreign reserves (e.g., Chinese investments
in Treasuries); (2) expansionary monetary policy during and after the 2001
recession; (3) the asset shift from Asia to the developed world studied by
CFG (2008a and 2008b); (4) a misperception that the world economy had
become less risky (￿the great moderation￿ ); and (5) misperceptions about
the riskiness of non-governmental debt, due partially to the expansion of
structured ￿nance and the blessings of the rating agencies. Finally, we
emphasise that a global savings glut probably does not explain the fall in
interest rates, since the period of falling interest rates coincided with a falling
global savings rate.
The paper is organised as follows. In Section II we describe the key
arguments ￿both empirical and theoretical ￿that contradict the theory of
a global savings glut. In Section III we discuss our alternative theory: asset
bubbles evoked a consumption boom in many developed countries, leading
to large current account de￿cits. In Section IV we conclude and discuss
open questions.
2 What￿ s wrong with the hypothesis of a global
savings glut?
In this section, we begin by describing movements in the global investment
rate, I/Y, and the global savings rate, S/Y. Then, we solve and calibrate a
model of an economy that receives an exogenous capital in￿ ow that is equal
to the current account de￿cits that the U.S. ran from 1996-2006 (the period
that Bernanke was discussing in his speeches on the global savings glut).
We show that most of this in￿ ow should have been absorbed as investment.
In contrast to this prediction, the U.S. investment rate ￿ uctuated over this
period and ended only marginally higher than it started.
6See Aizenman and Jinjarak (2008) for a much more detailed analysis of this relation-
ship.
32.1 Investment and savings during the ￿global savings glut￿
Figure 3 plots the U.S. current account de￿cit from 1929-2008 (the period
covered in the NIPA accounts).7 The current period of large global imbal-
ances began in the latter half of the 1990￿ s. Over the 80-year sample plotted
in Figure 3, the current account de￿cits peak in 2006, at 6.0% of GDP. The
next largest peak was about half as large: 3.3% in 1987.
Figure 3 about here
The recent extraordinary international imbalances have not been mir-
rored by extraordinary investment ￿ ows. While the U.S. ran enormous cur-
rent account de￿cits, the U.S. investment rate was little changed. Figure
4 plots the investment rate￿ gross private domestic investment divided by
GDP￿ from 1929-2008. The investment rate was 15.8% of GDP in 1996,
when the current account de￿cit was 1.5% of GDP. The investment rate
￿ uctuated from 1997 to 2006, falling to a low of 15.4% in 2002 and then
gently rising, ending in 2006, 1.6 percentage points higher than it started.
Speci￿cally, just two years before Bernanke stated the savings glut hypothe-
sis in 2005, the investment rate was 15.5%, which is below the level in 1996.
By contrast, the current account de￿cit rose nearly monotonically over the
1996-2006 period, peaking in 2006 4.5 percentage points above its starting
level.8
Figure 4 about here
This relatively stable investment rate may seem surprising in the midst
of the U.S. housing bubble. However, the housing bubble had only a modest
impact on total U.S. investment. Figure 5 outlines residential investment as
percentage of GDP for the US. In 1996, residential investment was 4.3% of
GDP while in 2006 the corresponding ￿gure was 5.7%. In 2005 residential
investment peaked at 6.1% of GDP.
Figure 5 about here
The global investment rate also changed little over this period. Accord-
ing to the IMF World Economic Outlook, the global investment rate was
7The U.S. National Income and Product Accounts (NIPA) are compiled by the U.S.
Bureau of Economic Analysis.
8Some authors claim that the NIPA account understates the true investment in the US.
This could change the conclusion that there was no investment boom. See e.g. Hausman
and Sturzenegger (2005) and McGrattan and Prescott (2009).
422.4% in 1996. Over the period 1996-2006, the global investment rate ￿rst
fell slightly and then rose slightly. Its trough value was 20.9% in 2002. In
2006, the global saving rate was 23.2%. Figure 6 plots the global investment
rate and the global savings rate.
Figure 6 about here
In principle, the global savings rate should match the global investment
rate. However, accounting problems create a small gap. In 1996 the global
savings rate was 22.3%. After this point, the global savings rate ￿rst fell
and then rose. Its trough value was 20.6%. In 2002 its value was 23.9%. In
2007 and 2008, the global savings rate continued to rise, partly as a result
of the ￿nancial crisis.
Modest changes in investment and savings rates are hard to reconcile
with a large outward shift in the supply of saving. However, such an outcome
is not impossible. For example, if the demand for saving were perfectly
inelastic, then the supply of saving could shift out without having any e⁄ect
on the equilibrium level of saving and investment.
However, a vertical demand curve for capital is inconsistent with a cali-
brated Cobb-Douglas production function. To quantitatively study the mag-
nitude of the e⁄ects that we should have observed, we next solve a partial
equilibrium model of an economy that receives a large capital in￿ ow.
3 Investment and capital in a partial equilibrium
economy
In this section we solve for equilibrium in a Cobb-Douglas economy that
receives an exogenous capital in￿ ow calibrated to match the U.S. current
account de￿cit from 1997 to 2006. We use this model to characterise the
e⁄ect of an exogenous capital in￿ ow on a developed economy like the U.S.9
3.1 The household￿ s optimisation problem
The economy is in competitive equilibrium, so individual agents treat prices




9The U.S. National Income and Product Accounts (NIPA) are compiled by the U.S.
Bureau of Economic Analysis.
5where ￿ is the (exponential) discount factor and u is the felicity function.





We adopt the following notational and timing assumptions.
1. Period t begins, with holdings of domestic capital Kt and foreign debt
Dt (a positive value of foreign debt represents a liability).
2. Factor payments RtKt, RtDt and Y L
t are made, where Rt is the gross
interest rate (which incorporates depreciation), r = R ￿ 1 is the net
interest rate, and Y L
t is labor income. We assume that labor supply is
exogenous, so Y L
t is exogenous from the perspective of the household.
3. The agent chooses consumption, Ct; subject to a dynamic budget con-
straint
Kt+1 ￿ Dt+1 = RtKt + Y L
t ￿ RtDt ￿ Ct:
4. Period t ends and period t + 1 begins.
Note that step 3 is underidenti￿ed, since the agent can accumulate wealth
either by acquiring capital, K; or paying o⁄her foreign debt, D: Conversely,
the agent can decumulate wealth either by reducing capital, K; or acquir-
ing foreign debt, D: This indeterminancy is resolved by exogenously ￿xing
the time-path of D: Hence, the endogenous margin from the perspective of
the domestic household is adjustment in K: We are interested in studying
the case of an exogenous timepath for D; since this reproduces the savings
glut hypothesis (from the perspective of the developed economies that are
importing capital from Asia).
The problem of the representative agent can be expressed recursively:
Vt(Kt;Dt) = u(Ct) + ￿Vt+1(Kt+1;Dt+1); (1)
where Vt is a (time-dependent) value function. The dependence of Vt on
equilibrium prices, like wages and interest rates, is suppressed among the
state variables, since wages and interest are exogenous from the perspective
7We omit the standard constant term,
￿1
1￿￿ to simplify exposition (thereby eliminating
a constant term in our value function). This omission is without loss of generality, since
the limit policies as ￿ ! 1 are una⁄ected by the omission (even though lim￿!1 u(c) is not
well-de￿ned).
6of the agent. These time-varying (individually exogenous) e⁄ects are cap-
tured by the time-varying structure of Vt: These dependencies will be made
explicit below.
We will guess and verify the following solution for the Bellman Equation
of the individual agent.
Vt(Kt;Dt) =
 t (RtKt + Y L












Note that  t is a time-dependent parameter to be solved. The discounted






The envelope theorem implies:
Ct =  
￿ 1
￿
t (RtKt + Y L
t ￿ RtDt + Ht): (4)
Substituting back into the Bellman Equation (1), yields,
 t(RtKt + Y L








 t+1(Rt+1Kt+1 + Y L
t+1 ￿ Rt+1Dt+1 + Ht+1)1￿￿
1 ￿ ￿
:
Substituting for Ct (Eq. 4) and dividing by (RtKt + Y L
t ￿ RtDt + Ht)1￿￿
yields,







(Rt+1Kt+1 + Y L
t+1 ￿ Rt+1Dt+1 + Ht+1)1￿￿
(RtKt + Y L
t ￿ RtDt + Ht)1￿￿
#
:
This can be further simpli￿ed by several more subsitutions. Eventually, the













The following algorithm characterises the optimal consumption path.
Start with fW0;D0g, the equilibrium sequence of interest rates fRtg
1
t=0 ;





t=0 : Let Ht be given by
















for all t: Equation (6) is the solution to equation (5). Then iterate the
following equations forward in time to solve for the optimal consumption
path.
Ct =  
￿ 1
￿
t (RtKt + Y L
t ￿ RtDt + Ht)
Kt+1 ￿ Dt+1 = RtKt + Y L
t ￿ RtDt ￿ Ct:
These equations are the consumption function and the dynamic budget con-
straint for ￿nancial wealth respectively.
3.2 The aggregate economy
The aggregate economy is characterised by a Cobb-Douglas production func-
tion (with labor supply, L; normalised to unity), so the production function
is,
F(K;L) = K￿L1￿￿ = K￿;
where K is the capital stock and 0 < ￿ < 1.
The marginal product of capital, net of capital depreciation, ￿; is
FK(K;L) = r = R ￿ 1 = ￿K￿￿1 ￿ ￿:
The marginal product of labor is
FL(K;L) = Y L = (1 ￿ ￿)K￿:
The aggregate dynamic budget constraint is given by
Kt+1 ￿ Dt+1 = K￿
t + (1 ￿ ￿)Kt ￿ RtDt ￿ Ct;
where D is the net foreign debt position.
We now review some basic national accounting identities. The current
account de￿cit in period t is ￿Dt+1 = Dt+1 ￿ Dt. The net foreign debt
position and the trade balance are related by the identity
￿Dt+1 = rtDt ￿ NXt:
8Gross domestic product can be decomposed into
K￿
t = Ct + It + NXt
= Ct + It ￿ Dt+1 + RtDt;
where It is gross domestic investment,
It = ￿Kt+1 + ￿Kt = K￿
t ￿ Ct + Dt+1 ￿ RtDt:

















Note that these expressions are related through the trade balance.
St = It + NXt:
3.3 Competitive Equilibrium
De￿nition: An allocation is a competitive equilbrium i⁄ the following
conditions hold for all t.
(i) Individual optimisation and dynamic budget constraints:
Ct =  
￿ 1
￿
t (RtKt + Y L
















Kt+1 ￿ Dt+1 = RtKt + Y L









(ii) Competitive factor pricing:
Rt = ￿K￿￿1
t + (1 ￿ ￿)
Y L
t = (1 ￿ ￿)K￿
t





The competitive equilibrium can be characterised by computationally
solving the model forward, perturbing the initial conditions, Ht and  t;
until the boundary condition is satis￿ed.
Finally, we can characterise the steady state:
R￿ = 1












The ￿rst equation is derived from the Euler Equation ￿ consumption is
constant when R￿ = 1. The second equation equates the interest rate with
the marginal product of capital. The third equation is the consumption




; and the steady state level of total wealth. The second and third
restrictions jointly imply that the dynamic budget constraint is satis￿ed.8
3.4 Simulations
To calibrate our simulations, we set ￿ = 0:33; ￿ = 0:97; ￿ = 0:04; and
￿ 2 f1;2;:::;5g: Recall that the time-path of D is ￿xed in our model, since we
are studying the e⁄ects of an exogenous ￿ ow of foreign capital that matches
the observed ￿ ow from 1996 to 2006. We therefore choose the sequence





































￿ ￿ ￿K ￿ rD
10current account de￿cits from 1996 to 2006. To identify the hypothetical
e⁄ect of a savings glut, we study the excess current account de￿cit, which
is de￿ned as the current account de￿cit in year t minus the current account
de￿cit that existed before the savings glut (i.e. the 1996 current account
de￿cit). We choose the sequence of Dt values so that the calibrated current
account de￿cits (as a percent of GDP) match the empirical excess current
account de￿cits (as a percent of GDP).
Figure 7 reports our simulated results, from 1996 to 2006 for the ￿ve dif-
ferent values of ￿: The predicted pattern of investment (relative to the 1996
baseline) does not match the observed pattern of investment. Two prob-
lems are apparent. First, simulated investment rises almost monotonically,
while empirical investment ￿ uctuates, even falling below its starting point
in the middle of the savings glut period. Second, the simulated increase in
investment is much larger than the empirical increase in investment.
Figure 7 about here.
This analysis quantitatively con￿rms the intuition that we reviewed be-
fore. An exogenous in￿ ow of capital should have led to an investment boom
in the U.S. (so U.S. households would be in a good position to repay their
new debts), but no investment boom occurrred.
4 Bubble-based model of global imbalances
We now turn to an alternative explanation for global imbalances. This alter-
native is simple: a select group of countries experienced asset bubbles, caus-
ing consumption booms and trade de￿cits in those countries. Conversely,
their trading partners experienced trade surpluses.
4.1 The Model
We adopt the same notation as before, but we now make three simplifying
assumptions to improve tractability. First, we use continuous time. This
is purely for analytic convenience and has no impact on our quantitative
results. Many of our expressions are more compact in continuous time. Sec-
ond, we study a small open economy that faces ￿xed world factor prices.
Third, we study the steady state case in which the discount rate equals the
interest rate. These three assumptions enable us to express our results as
simple closed form expressions. Generalising the second and third assump-
11tions does very little to change the quantitative implications of the bubble
analysis that follows.
The representative household maximises an exponentially weighted in-





dK = Y L ￿ C + r(K ￿ D) + dD:
Here ￿ is the exponential discount rate, K is domestic capital, Y L is labor
income, C is consumption, r is the interest rate, and D equals foreign debt.
As we already stated, we assume that r = ￿ (a steady state restriction).
Again, we assume ￿ is the coe¢ cient of constant relative risk aversion.
We assume that a bubble begins an instant after date tB and ends at
date tB + N. In other words, the bubble exists when t 2 (tB; tB + N]: We
assume that the asset bubble immediately raises the notional value of ￿xed
capital by an increment ￿K: We think of this as the (discounted) value of
productivity gains that are anticipated to occur at some date in the future
(say N periods away).9 In the setting that we are studying, the marginal
propensity to consume out of wealth is r; so that the ￿K increase in notional
wealth leads consumption to rise by r￿K:
Since, r = ￿; pre-bubble consumption is equal to the annuity value of
wealth:
C = Y L + r(K ￿ D):
Bubble consumption is the annuity value of bubble-inclusive wealth:
C0 = Y L + r(K ￿ D) + r￿K:
Recall that assets appreciate at rate r; so throughout the bubble period
households hold wealth with notional value ￿K +K ￿D: Capital gains and
dividends are exactly o⁄set by consumption.
9These productivity gains need to be anticipated to occur in the future, to enable the
bubble to persist in the meantime. The bubble bursts once the anticipated gains are
not realized. In this way our model touches upon that of Beaudry and Portier (2007)
where news about the future changes expectations in a way that impacts consumption,
investment and growth. Even more relevant is Christiano et al (2007), which investigages
what happens when such expectations turn out to be wrong.
12During the bubble period, households have a shortfall in income from
domestic assets of r￿K; which is borrowed from abroad.10 The resulting
change to the trade de￿cit (which is the same as the change to the current
account de￿cit) is
r￿K:
The trade de￿cit continues at this level throughout the bubble period. By
contrast, the current account de￿cit grows, since the foreign debt is grow-
ing. Households must also pay interest on the accumulating shortfalls. Inte-
grating these ￿ ows, yields the net accumulation of foreign debt during any
sub-period, (tB;tB + ￿]; of the bubble period (where ￿ < N):
DtB+￿ ￿ DtB =
Z ￿
0
r￿K exp(r[￿ ￿ s])ds
= [exp(r￿) ￿ 1]￿K:
So the (change in the) current account de￿cit from date 0; an instant before
the bubble starts, to date ￿ < N; is
jCAtB+￿ ￿ CAtBj = r￿K + r[exp(r￿) ￿ 1]￿K:
Just before the bubble bursts, at time tB +N; assets can be decomposed
into domestic assets valued at
￿K exp(rN) + K;
and debt to foreign agents valued at
D + [exp(rN) ￿ 1]￿K:
Note that the di⁄erence of these two terms is
￿K + K ￿ D:
When the bubble bursts, the household is left with net assets:
K ￿ D ￿ [exp(rN) ￿ 1]￿K:
10We assume that households borrow from foreign agents rather than selling the for-
eign agents over-valued domestic assets. The domestic agents have no reason to sell the
domestic assets since they don￿ t recognize that they are overvalued. Moreover, if the over-
valued assets have value that is best-realized by local owners (e.g., residential real estate),
then there are good reasons to expect that the foreign agents will primarily acquire ￿xed
income claims.
13So consumption falls from
Y L + r(K ￿ D) + r￿K
to
Y L + r(K ￿ D) ￿ r[exp(rN) ￿ 1]￿K:
In other words, consumption falls by
r￿K exp(rN):
We can decompose this into two e⁄ects:
r￿K |{z} ￿ exp(rN)
| {z }
Direct bubble e⁄ect Accumulated debt e⁄ect
:
The direct bubble e⁄ect is the reversal in the initial consumption boom. The
accumulated debt e⁄ect is the consequence of accumulating debt at interest
rate r over an interval of length N: As the duration of the bubble goes
to zero, the accumulated debt e⁄ect vanishes, since limN!0 exp(rN) = 1:
As the duration of the bubble increases, the accumulated debt e⁄ect grows
exponentially.
4.1.1 Calibration of the bubble model
To calibrate the bubble-model, we set r = 0:03 and ￿ = 0:97; since, in steady
state, R￿ = 1. In steady state, the marginal propensity to consume is equal
to r: Most empirical analysis estimates a 0.03 to 0.05 marginal propensity to
consume (out of asset wealth). We will also consider MPC￿ s over this range.
We also need to calibrate the bubble-component of the value of assets
owned by U.S. households. Figure 8 plots the U.S. ratio of household wealth
to GDP.11 This series ￿ uctuated historically in a range, roughly between 3
and 3.5 units of GDP. Starting in the mid-1990￿ s, however, the series broke
from this historical range and rose sharply. At its peak in the second quarter
of 2007, the series reached a value of 4.68 units of GDP. By the ￿rst quarter
of 2009, the series had fallen back to upper bound of its old range. These
comparisons imply an estimated bubble value of 1.2 units of GDP ($17
trillion).12
11The numerator is compiled by the Federal Reserve and is available back to 1952.
12The 2007 ratio of household wealth to GDP misses part of the value of the bubble in
2007, since it nets out the value of debt accumulated to ￿nance consumption during the
preceding bubble years (from 1996 to 2007). The key contributor is mortgage debt, which
increased from 0.44 units of GDP in 1996:1 to 0.75 units of GDP in 2007:2. This analysis
implies an additional bubble increment of 0.3 units of GDP.
14Hence, bubble-driven consumption should have amounted to r￿1:2 units
of GDP, or 3.6 percent of GDP. With an MPC of 0.04, the magnitude of
excess (bubble-driven) consumption rises to 4.8 percent of GDP. With an
MPC of 0.05, the magnitude rises to 6 percent of GDP.
These predictions of excess-consumption levels compare well to the excess
trade de￿cits that the U.S. ran during the height of the bubble period. In
1996, before the advent of high asset prices, the trade de￿cit was 1.5 percent
of GDP. The peak trade de￿cit (2006) reached 6.0 percent of GDP, or a
di⁄erence of 4.5 percentage points of GDP in comparison to the 1996 level.
This preliminary analysis suggests that bubble-driven consumption might
explain the level of U.S. trade imbalances. However, the analysis is incom-
plete, because we do not have a precise theory of the lags that relate current
consumption to lagged movements in asset prices. Habit-based preferences,
adjustment costs (it takes time to sell one home and buy another), and
informational lags all create a subtle lagged relationship between wealth
movements and consumption responses. We have only begun to think about
these important and complex issues.
4.2 Empirical relationship between price appreciation of res-
idential real estate and current account de￿cits
The model described above implies that countries that experience an asset
bubble should also experience a consumption boom and a commensurate
current account de￿cit. Figure 2 depicts the cross-sectional relationship be-
tween (country-level) price appreciation of housing and the current account
de￿cit.12 Figure 9 depicts the same relationship for the trade de￿cit. Our
analysis includes China plus all of the 18 countries for which the OECD
reports price index data on residential real estate (the alphabetised list is in
Table 1). We were not able to ￿nd additional countries with price data that
was of high quality. We continue to take 1996 as the starting point. The
end points vary by country, since they are chosen to match the peak year
of the price of residential real estate.12 This bracketing approach captures
12For Norway, the balance of trade and the current account are dominated by petroleum
exports. Moreover, oil prices were highly volatile during this period that we started. To
address this issue, for Norway we use data on the balance of trade excluding oil. This is a
special series produced by Statistics Norway. Since there is no data reported on Norway￿ s
current account balance exclusive of oil, and since Norway￿ s unadjusted balance of trade
and unadjusted current account are extremely close in magnitude, we use the balance of
trade, exclusive of oil, in both the current account and the balance of trade analyses.
12If there were more than one peak, which is very rare, we have taken the higher of the
two peaks. When we de￿ne a situation as being characterized by ￿no bubble￿it is either
15the relationship between housing prices and the current account (or trade
balance) during the build-up of housing prices. Table 1 shows the peak years
for the 19 countries in our sample.12
Figure 9 about here
Table 1 about here
For each country, we calculate the real appreciation of the prices of res-
idential real estate. For all countries except China we use housing price
index data from the OECD. For China, we use an index of residential real
estate prices from the Chinese National Bureau of Statistics. To calculate
a measure of the current account balance, or balance of trade, we take the
de￿cit or surplus in 1996 as the starting point, and then accumulate all de-
viations from that starting point over the subsequent years until the peak of
the residential real estate price. We then normalise this accumulated total,
dividing by GDP in 2008.
To calculate our regression lines, we ran weighted regressions using real
housing price appreciation as the independent variable and the accumulated
current account balance, or the accumulated balance of trade, as the depen-
dent variable. Table 2 reports these regressions. Our sample of 19 countries
displays a strong negative relationship (p-value < 0.001) between housing
price appreciation and the current account surplus (R2 = 0.52) and between
housing price appreciation and the trade surplus (R2 = 0.50).12
Table 2 about here
These correlations do not settle the issue of causation (cf Basco 2009).
There is, however, some evidence suggesting that causality runs from asset
bubbles to current account de￿cits. For example, Greenspan and Kennedy
(2007, 2008), show that the increases in housing prices contributed sub-
stantially to the consumption boom via home equity loans and mortgage
re￿nancing cash-outs. In 2005, these liquidity channels generated nearly
$500 billion in ￿ ows to households.
because prices have continued to rise (Switzerland) or because prices have been falling
(Germany and Japan).
12For countries that did not experience a housing bubble and hence have no peak year
we use data until 2008, which is the last year for which data is available.
12Only Ireland fails to ￿t our balance of trade regression line (though Ireland is not an
outlier in the current account regression. For most countries, the current account balance
and the balance of trade are very close in value. This congruence can break down for
countries that have large net foreign asset imbalances.
165 Two Open Questions
There are many open questions that we have failed to address, but two
stand out in our minds. First, our model takes the existence of the asset
bubbles as given and does not explain their origins. This is a critical research
question that others have started to address (See e.g. Akerlof and Shiller
2009; Basco 2009; CFG 2008a,b; Caballero and Krishnamurthy, 2006). We
anticipate a generation of debate about the origins and even the existence
of these bubbles.
Second, our model does not explain why global interest rates fell between
2000 and 2003, and thereafter stayed at a relatively low level. For example,
Figure 10 plots the interest rate for 10-year Treasury In￿ ation Protected
Securities (TIPS).12 According to the savings glut hypothesis, the low inter-
est rates resulted from a savings boom. However, as we have shown above,
there was no global boom in savings/investment. Indeed, during the period
that interest rates were falling (2000-2003), the global savings/investment
rate was falling (see Figure 6). We now quickly summarize ￿ve alternative
reasons that interest rates fell from 2000-2003 and remained low thereafter.12
First, there are was a substantial asset reallocation from equities to ￿xed
income instruments during and after the bursting of the tech bubble (see
Caballero and Krishnamurthy, 2008 for a theoretical treatment of the ￿ ight
to quality). This trend was enhanced by the advent of monetary authorities
with a preference for holding large quantities of reserves invested in U.S.
Treasuries (e.g., the People￿ s Bank of China). Second, monetary policy was
highly expansionary during and after the 2001 recession. In just 2.5 years,
the federal funds rate was lowered from 6.5% to 1%. However, monetary
policy does not explain why the real interest rate stayed low after this expan-
sionary policy was scaled back starting in 2004 (see Ahmed et al., 2002, for
a discussion about the role of monetary policy during this period). Third,
global asset scarcity caused by the Asian Financial Crises of 1997-1998 con-
tributed to a fall in U.S. interest rates (CFG, 2008a, b; Caballero and Krish-
12The markets for in￿ ation-indexed bonds su⁄er from some idiosyncrasies that make
interpretation of the data problematic. In the UK in￿ ation-indexed bonds were issued in
the early 1980s, but in most other countries these markets are much younger. The US
government started issuing Treasury In￿ ation-Protected Securities (TIPS) in 1997. The
markets for in￿ ation-indexed bonds have also had very low volume. The market and its
quirks are discussed in Campbell et al. (2009).
12Numerous attempts have been made to ￿nd a uni￿ed model that can explain the
behaviour of interest rates over longer time periods. The attempts have generally been
successful in explaining a subset of the stylized facts. See e.g. Barro and Sala-i-Martin
(1990).
17namurthy, 2009). Fourth, until the most recent crisis, there was a growing
consensus that the developed economies had become less risky ￿￿the great
moderation￿(Kim, Chang-Jin, and Charles Nelson, 1999; McConnell, and
Perez-Quiros, 2000; Blanchard and Simon, 2001; Kahn et al., 2002; Stock
and Watson, 2003; Bernanke, 2004). This perception lowered the risk pre-
mium for non-governmental debt. Fifth, the advent of structured ￿nance
with the increased demand for AAA-rated assets and the encouragement of
the rating agencies, contributed to lower risk-premium for non-governmental
￿xed income ￿nancing (Caballero, 2009; Mendoza and Terrones, 2008).
Figure 10 about here
There are many reasons that interest rates declined from 2000-2003 and
then failed to return to their old high levels. A global savings glut does
not appear to us to be one of those reasons. Interest rates fell at the same
time that the global savings/investment rate also fell. The unprecedented
trade and current account imbalances appear to us to be well-explained as a
response to country-speci￿c asset bubbles, particularly the housing bubbles
(but also the equity market bubbles). We have shown that country-level
appreciation in residential real estate alone explains half of the variance
in current account de￿cits during this period. Consumers with notionally
healthy balance sheets went on a spending boom that started in the late
1990￿ s. Now that the bubbles have burst, it is clear that those households
spent beyond their means. We anticipate that those international imbalances
will eventually disappear as households in the bubble economies gradually
scale back their lifestyles to match their much-reduced wealth.
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Dependent variable Coefficient estimate p‐value R‐square
CA accumulation, 1996‐peak ‐0.33 0.000 0.5211
BoT accumulation, 1996‐peak (incl. Ireland) ‐0.29 0.001 0.5015
BoT accumulation, 1996‐peak (ex. Ireland) ‐0.32 0.000 0.5882